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been at last tardily roused, and a means is offered to prevent the
wrong for the future, we should find it opposed, and probably with
success, by an appeal for the interests of a class. The publishers
of this country are doubtless a respectable body of men. Habit
has blunted their perceptions to the immorality of their coursethe sanction of an external legality has sbieldedthem from punishment-the whole country has been their accomplice. But such a
plea, however soothing. to the conscience, has been always repudiated by the common sense of mankind, whenever it has been
urged. There were large and flourishing houses in Algiers, before
the time of Lord Exnouth; the Dyaks of Borneo did a brisk
business in "other men's property, till the advent of Sir James
Brooke; but the trade of piracy was too great a nuisance to stand
any longer, however lucrative to thoae who exercised it. There are
milder forms of dishonesty now, subsisting; but the world has not
yet learnt that they cease to be wrong because they are profitable.
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In the Circuit Court of the UJnited States,for the Ea etrn .District
of -Pennylvania.
EX PARTE JOHN JENKINS AND JAMES .CROSSO.
1. Under the Act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1888, ch. 57, sect. 7, (commonly
called the Force Bill,) any Judge of the Supreme or District Court of the United
States,'has authority to grant a writ of habeas cwrps, where a prisoner in jail or
confinement, has been committed or confined, "on or by any authority or law, for
any.act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States,
or any order, process, or decree ofany Judge or Court thereof.",
2. A petition for a habeas corpus by two deputies of the Marshal of the United States,
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, set forth that a warrant, under the
Fugitive Slave Act, of 1850, duly issued by a Commissioner, having been placed
in their hands, they were resisted in its execution by the prisoner, who succeeded
in escaping; bAd. that they were subiequently arrested, and imprisoned under
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color of a warrant from a Justice of the peace, in the State of Pennsylvania,
-charging them with an assault and battery, with an intent to kill, upon the fugitive; and prayed their discharge. The return to the writ merely set forth the
warrant of the Justice, duly granted upon oath: Held, that the writ was properly
allowed under the Act of 1833, ; that evidence was admissible on the part of the
relators, to show the true state of the facts, notwithstanding the return ; and that
such evidence, showing that the violence alleged, if any used, was in discharge
of the prisoner's duty, under a law of the United States, they must be discharged.
8. On a hearing on a habeas corpus, under the ict of 1833, the State, by virtue of
whose laws the arrest was made, is the only party entitled to be represented by
counsel. Neither the prosecutor, nor the officer making the arrest, have a right
to be heard.

This was a hearing on a habeas corpus, issued out of the Circuit
Court. The facts very fully appear in the opinion of .the Court,
which was delivered by
GIUEu, J.-As all cases involving questions concerning the jurisdiction and powers of the courts of the United States, and those of
the several States, especially if they have any connexion with the
Act of Congress "concerning fugitives from justice, and persons
escaping from the service of their masters," excite much public
attention, and seem peculiarly liable to misrepresentation, from the
garbled statements of those who undertake to report tlem, I have
concluded to reduce to writing the opinions I entertain in this
case.
Our very peculiar institutions, which require of every citizen a
double allegiance, and obedience to two distinct sovereigns with
independent judiciary systems emanating from each, make it especially necessary that great caution and prudence be exercised by
their respective tribunals, in order to avoid any collision or conflict
in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions over the same subjects and persons. That there should be great diversity of opinion
as to the limits of the power of either sovereign and its courts may
naturally be expected. But without adopting the political opinions
of extremists on either side, it is the duty of courts, in order to
have no unpleasant collisions, to carefully avoid the assumption of
powers not plainly confided to them, .and at the same time to per10
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form the duties imposed upon them with firmness and resolution,
disregarding the clamor or the contumely of heated partizans.
The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is limited, 'but
within its limits, supreme. The state courts have often, in many
cases, a concurrent jurisdiction over the same subjects and persons.
But neither can treat the other as an inferior-jurisdiction, except
in the cases where the Constitution and Acts of Congress have
given such power to the courts of the Union. Where persons or
property are liable to seizure or arrest by thie process of both, that
which first attaches should have the preference. Any .attempt of
either to take them from the legal custody of the officers of the
other, would'be an unjustifiable exercise of its power, and lead to
most deplorable consequences. Therefore, if a person be imprisoned under the civil or criminal process of one, the other cannot
take him from such custody, in order to subject him to punishment
for an offense against them. A fugitive connot be taken from the
legal custody of the sheriff, by any warrant from the courts of the
United States, in order to extradition under the 'Acti of Congress.
Neither can such fugitive, when in custody of the Marshal, under
legal process from a Judge or Commissioner of the United Statbs, be
delivered from such custody by means of &habeas corpus, or any
other process, to answer for an offence against the state, whether
felony or misdemeanor, or for any other purpose. While the Act
of Congress does not forbid the issuing of a habeas corpus by a
State Judge, it carefully guards against the abuse of it, and makes
a certificate of a Commissioner or Judge of the United States
"conclusive evidence of the right of the person or persons in
whose favor it is granted to remove such fugitive," and forbids all "molestation of such person or persons by any process
issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whom'soever." This Act of Congress is the supreme law of the land, and
binding on the conscience of State Judges, as well as those of the
United States. Judges of the United States, as well as those of
State Courts, are therefore bound to dismiss a writ of habeas corpus, or to refuse to allow it, whenever they are properly informed
that the prisoner is held by legalprocess under tlis act, and not to
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suffer it to be abused by mischievous intermeddlers, for the purpose
of "molestation" of the officer or owner of the fugitive in effecting
his extradition. The laws of the United States give ample remedy
by habeas corpus for those illegally imprisoned under color of their
process, and State Courts have in many instances exercised a concurrent jurisdiction in similar cases. But State Courts or Judges
have no power, under a habeas corpus) to review or sit in error
upon the judgment, or process of the judicial officers of the United
States, acting within the jurisdiction committed to them, as has
sometimes been done. I have known of one instance (and have
heard of others) where a fugitive, legally in custody, has been discharged on habeas corpus, under pretence or affectation of judicial
ignorance that slavery existed in Virginia. Such an abuse of judicial discretion was held to be no defence to those who knowingly
rescued the fugitive by means of it. Whether such an illegal dis-charge would protect the Marshal from the high penalty inflicted
on him for permitting an escape, may well be doubted: and if he
should resist it, as possibly he would, it would lead to a very
unpleasant conflict, which every good citizen should be careful to
prevent.
I have made these remarks as preliminary to entering upon the
question naw before us, in order to rectify a misapprehension and
gross misapplication of those made on a former occasion; and also,
that persons whose zeal in favor of fugitives is sometimes permitted
so far to outrun their discretion, may be aware of the mischievous
consequences, both to themselves and others, which are likely to
ensue from attempts thus to abuse the process of State Courts, and
bring them into conflict with those of the United States.
The prisoners, John Jenkins and James Crosson, have been
brought before the Court by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus,
issued and allowed by me on the 4th of October, and directed to J.
F. Chollet. The petition for this writ sets forth, that the petitioners are Deputies of the Marshal of the United States for this District; that a warrant was placed in their hands by said Marshal,
issued by E. D. Ingraham, Esq., Commissioner, and endorsed by a
Judge of the Supreme Court, diredting them to arrest a.negro
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named William Thomas, who being held to labor and service in the
State of Virginia, and owing the same to a certain Isham Keith, of
Fauquier County, Virginia, had escaped therefrom into the State
of Pennsylvania; that they proceeded to Wilkesbarre, Luzerne
County, Pennsylvania, where the fugitive was found; that they
attempted to arrest him in obedience to said.warrant; that the
arrest was resisted with great violence, and after a severe struggle
the fugitive succeeded in escaping. They complain that they have
been arrested and imprisoned under color of a warrant from a justice of the peace of Luzerne County, charging them with an assault
and battery on said fugitive with intent to kill, and pray to be discharged from such imprisonment..
To this writ of habea8 corpu8 Chollet makes return, that he

detains the prisoners by virtue of a certain warrant issued by Gilbert Burroughs, a Justice of the Peace for the Borough of Wilkesbarre, and endorsed by an Alderman of Philadelphia.
The warrant sets forth an information, upon the oath of a certain
William C. Gildersleeve, "that George Wynkoop, John Jenkins and
James Carson, in a riotous manner, with pistols and other weapons,
beat and wounded a certain colored man. named Bill, and that they
assaulted, beat and abused the said Bill, as the deponent believed,
with intent to kill him."
On the return of this writ, on Wednesday last, objection was
made to any action by the Court upon it, by learned counsel, who
appeared, without stating on whose behalf, or by whom they were
authorized to interfere in the matter. Being desirous to hear any
objections which could be.made as to the extent of the power of the
Court in this matter, these gentlemen were willingly heard as amici.
curice, without any inquiry as to who had authorized them to take
a part in the proceedings-.
It was objected that the Court had no authority to discharge the
prisoners, because they were held by a warrant from'a State Magistrate, for an alleged Criminal offence, against the State of Pennsylvania, and that the warrant was conclusive evidence of the fact. To
a habeas corpus issued by this Court under the general authority
conferred on them by the judiciary Act, this objection would be
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conclusive. But this writ was not allowed and issued under the
general law, but under the special powers conferred by the Seventh
Section of the Act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1833, oh. 57,
which, so far as is material to our present enquiry, is as follows:
"'And be it further'enacted, That either of the Justices of the
Supreme Court, or a Judge of any District Court of the United
States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner
or prisoners in jail or confinement, where he or they shall be committed or confined, on or by any authority or law, for any act done
or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States,
or any order, process or decree of any Judge or Court thereof,
anything in any Act of Congress to the contrary notwitlistanding."
For the purpose of the discussion and argument of this point, it
was necessary to assume that the facts set forth in the prisoners"
petition were true, leaving the proof of them to be made out afterwards. The petition states distinctly that the prisoners have been
committed for an act done in executing process issued in pursuance
of a law of the United States. It therefore comes within the provisions of this Act.
"The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ known to
the commoh law; the great object of which is the liberation of
those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is in the
nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the commitment; it brings the body of the prisoner up, together with the
cause of his confinement. The Court can undoubtedly inquire into
the sufficieiicy of that cause." (See -Exparte Wlatkins, 3 Peters,
201.)
A warrant of arrest issued by a justice of the peace, has none of
the characteristics of a judgment of a court of record,, and is therefore not conclusive evidence that the prisoner is rightly deprived of
his liberty. It is every day's practice to inquire into its regularity,
and whether it has been issued on sufficient grounds to justify the
arrest and imprisonment. If this could not be done, the writ of
habeas corpus, would little deserve the eulogies which it has
received as a protection to the liberty of the citizen. Warrants of
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arrest, issued on the application of private informers, may show on
their face a prima facie charge sufficient to give jurisdiction to the
justice; but it may be -founded'on mistake, ignorance, malice, or
perjury. To put a case very similar to the present: A. tells B.
that he has seen C. kill D.

B. runs off to a justice, swears to the

murder boldly, without any knowledge of the fact, and takes out a
warrant for C., who is arrested and imprisoned in consequence
thereof. C. prays a habeas corpus, and shows that he was the
Sheriff of the county, and hanged D., in pursuance of a legal varrant. if a Court could 'not discharge a prisoner in such a cse,
because the .warrant was regular on its face, the writ of habeas
corpus is of little use. Every arrest of the person-is an assault
and battery, and attended with force and violence against a resisting party; and, if made by three or more persons, is a-rlot, provided the fact be concealed that it was made in execution of a legal
warrant.
The authority conferred on the Judges of the Uifted States, by
this Act of Congress,-gives them all the power that any other Court
could exercise under the writ of habeas corpus, or gives them none
at all. If under such a writ they may not discharge their officer
when imprisoned "by any authority for an act done in pursuance
of a law of the United States," it would be impossible to discover
for what useful purpose the act was passed. Is the prisoner to be
brought before them only that they may acknowledge thaeir utter
impotence to protect him? This act was passed when a certain
State of this Union had threatened to nullify Acts of Congres,
and to treat those as criminals who should attempt to execute them;
and it was intended as a remedy against such State legislation. If
the State of Pennsylvania had, by Act of Legislature, declared tjat
the fugitive law should not be executed within her borders, ana had
directed her officers to arrest and imprison those of the United
States who should attempt to execute it, would not this Court have
been bound to -treat such act as unconstitutional and void, and discharge their officers from imprisonment under it? And have they
no power to do so, when mischievous intermeddlers endeavor to
prevent and abuse State process for the same purpose? If the
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Marshal and his officers may be arrested for serving process, why
not the Commissioner and Judge who issued the process? The
extremest advocate of State rights would scarcely contend that in
such cases the Courts of the United States should be wholly unable
to protect themselves or their officers. Let us look at the consequences. While the Marshal's officers, in this case, were endeavoring to retake the prisoner who had escaped from them, the person
who afterwards swore to the information on which this warrant
issued, had a warrant put in the hands of the Sheriff, which he
very wisely refused to execute, knowing the persons charged to be
acting under authority of the laws of the United States. Now, let
us suppose, the Marshal's officers had succeeded in making the
arrest, and the Sheriff had attempted to execute the pr6cess, what
would have been the consequence? If the Marshal resists, a contest esues, which may be called, in fact, a war between officers,
each acting and justifying their conduct under process from their
respective sovereigns. If the Sheriff succeed, as probablyhe would,
the fugitive is discharged, and the officers of the United States conveyed to prison. If such a state of affairs can be brought about at
the instance of any mischievous or unprincipled person, who is
willing to swear, without scruple, to that which he does not know
to be true; or perhaps knows to be false; then, indeed, has been
discovered a safe mode of nullifying the Constitution and Laws of
the United States. Those who celebrate the anniversaries of the
Syracuse riots, and of the Christiana murder, may well rejoice at
the discovery.
Not believing that the Courts of the United States have been
left in this helpless condition, or that we are required and authorized to issue a habeas corpus, without any power to release the
prisoners, if unjustly detained, the objections to the jurisdiction
and power of the Court were overruled, and the further hearing of
the case postponed till the 12th of October, in order that proof
might be made of the facts stated in the petition, and that the
State of Peuntylvania, through her known officers, might appear,
if she saw fit, and show any just cause of complaint against the
officers now in arrest.
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. On that day, the same learned gentlemen, who had appeared on
the former occasion, came forward and proposed to take a part in
the proceedings. They were reqluested to state whom they represented, and to show their authority, if they had any, to intervene
on behalf of the State of Pennsylvania. It was answered that they
had been employed by the constable who made the arrest, to
which it was replied, by the Court, that their duty to their client
ended when they had made out his return to the writ of hea8
corpm; that the constable had no more concern with the result
of this proceeding than any other citizen; that the United States
government has appeared by its proper representative in defence
of its officers; and if the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by any
officer entitled. to represent her, avows this proceeding and com-,
plains that her laws have been transgressed by the prisoners, they
should be heard. That; if the gentlemen had any authority from
the Governor or Attorney General of Pennsylvania, or from the
Prosecuting, Attorney of Luzerne county, they should be heard.
But as the Couit had no reason to believe that any of those officers
had shown, or would show, the least countenance to such proceedings, and as the person who had a right .to complain as the injured
party, (if any one had,) has confessed the justice of his arrest by
fleeing the country, We would- n6t permit -mere volunteers to interfere for the putpose of embroiling the State of Pennsylvania,
against her will, with the United States, or that any society of
persons, however respectablej should assume to be the guardians
of her peace and dignityT.

Evidence was. then received to show -that.the prisoners were
deputies of the marshal; that a lawful warrant was put into their.
hands commanding them to arrest one William Thomas, a fugitve
from-labor; that in pursuance of this warrant, they- arrested said
fugitive; that he resisted with great violence, and made attempts
to wound and kill the officers; that he succeeded in -escaping from
their arrest, ran into the river, where, armed with a knife, he declared he would not be taken alive ; and that the officers, seeing
this to be his determination, -gave up the attempt to re-capture him,
and came away.; and that for the~e acts, done in obedience to their
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writ, they had been falsely charged with riot and assault and bat,
tery. The Counsel for the prisoners having thus shown, as they
contende3d, a case sufficient to authorize their discharge, closed their
case. But the Court being informed that a number of respectable
persons were present, who had witnessed the transaction, and being
desirous to ascertain whether the officers had acted in an unjustifiable manner, such as to call for censure or punishment, ordered
the depositions of those- persons to be taken by a Commissioner.
In order, also, to ascertain upon what grounds the sworn information was made, and who were the persons prosecuting it, the deposition of William C. Gildersleeve, on whose oath the warrant was
founded, was also taken: it being due to that person that he should
be allowed to justify himself for the course he has pursued. In
order to obtain this warrant for the prisoners, he had signed a
deposition, stating positively that the prisoners had committed an
assault and battery on Bill or William Thomas, with pistols, &c.,
with intent to kill him. He now says, on oath, that he was not
present, and knows nothing of the transaction whatever; that he
did not see William Thomas that day at all; that a certain Joseph
Easterline had told him "that a man was shot at the river bank
and was dying," and "that it was a colored man that was shot ;"
that he immediately consulted Ir. Collins, and after finding out
the name of one of the prisoners, that he then went to a Justice of
the Peace, and told him that there had been a man shot at the
river bank, and he wanted a warrant; that the Justice wrote out
an information and read it to him, and he swore to it-to the best of
his knowledge and belief; that he never swore out a warrant
against any body before, and it was a new business to him, but he
did it by the counsel of Collins; that he did not know that the persons who attempted to arrest Bill were officers at that time; that he
cannot tell what he swore to before Esquire Goff, in order to obtain
the warrant; that he did not see the prisoners fire pistols-got
all his information from Easterline and Seaman; that "bis interview with them was very brief-done in a minute;" that he had
no belief of what the *officers came for, his "mind being wholly
intent on the single subject of obtaining a warrant at that time ;"
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that he thought a man had been killed by shots, and made no further inquiry; that he got the warrant and delivered it -to the
Sheriff, and told him he wanted him to execute it. Nothing was
done on this warrant. Some two weeks after this, after the -witness
.had learned that the fugitive was not shot, and that the prisoners
were officers, and had made an unsuccessful attempt to arrest the
fugitive, an affidavit was brought to him, ready written out by
Squire Burroughs,. (on which this warrant Was issued.) Burroughs
had made out the affidavit at the request of Messrs. Brown and
Jackson; that it was. intended when the informatioh was drawn
out, that one Kutz should swear to it, but as it was inconvenient
to find Kutz, the Squire told'him it did not make a particle of difference whether-he or Kutz swore to it, and he signedand swore'to it,
after hearing it read; that he cannot -tell-who employed" Messrs.
Jackson and Brown, butsupposed it was some person:in.Philadelphia;
that lhe knew nothing of them until they introduced themselves to
him in his store; that it never oame into his mind to state:tothe
magistrate that the persons claimed-to be Marshal's dfficers:making
an arrest; and finally, that "he lknew nothing about any pistol or
fire arms, or any knives and'forks,. or any thing :under heaven."
Comment on such conduct is superfluous. Itis enough to say,.
that it shows to the court, that .while the-sane and intelligent portion of the population of Wilkesbarre, who witnessed -this transaction, and the public prosecutor, whose duty it was to prosecute
offences against the public peace, have not seen proper to institute
any proceedings, some- philanthropic individuals, or association in
Philadelphia, have volunteered to take the people of Luzerne County
under their protection, and have been so:fortunate as to find a wit-ness willing to swear- to an information, of -the truth or falsehooa
of which, by his own acdount, he was utterly ignorant. -Imputing
no bad motive to the witness for such rash and ill advised-conduot,
we think he has suffered his zeal to outrun his discretion, and are
pleased to see that he is now better informed, and. in his last deposition, has refused to "testify to that which he has heard by report
from others," and that he now believes, "that rumor is no testimony."
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In order to correct any false impressions which may have been
received with regard to this transaction, we think it proper to give
a brief history of the facts as elicited from the testimony of numerous and respectable eye witnesses who have been examined, and
testify, not to rumor, but to what they saw and heard.
The three deputies of the Marshal, accompanied by two gentlemen from Virginia, who were well acquainted with the fugitive to
be arrested, entered the dining room of the Phenix Hotel, in the
morning, about seven o'clock, and found the negro Bill, or William
Thomas, in the room: The agent of the owner took hold of the
fugitive, and handed him over to the officers, saying, "this is the
boy I require you to take under the warrant." As the officers
proceeded to arrest him, telling him they were United States officers, a violent struggle ensued; the landlord of the hotel, who was
sitting at his breakfast, got up and went around the table, and said,.
"Bill, give up, there is no use to resist." Bill called for his pistols.
The landlord attempted to get hold of him; Bill made a pass at
him to hit him in the face, but missed it, and struck him on the
shoulder. The officers attempted to secure him, one of them seized
him round the waist-he was thrown on the floor, but rising with
them, he obtained possession of a carving knife, and attempted to
stab Mr. Settle, who had come to the assistance of the officers.
This blow was partially warded off by another person, so that
Settle was struck with the handle, instead of the point of the knife,
on his elbow, and disabled from rendering further assistance. The
knife being taken from him, the officers endeavoured to secure the
prisoner's hands with shackles or handcuffs, but succeeded only in
getting them on his right wrist, when Bill struck Crosson, one of
the deputies, over the head with the handcuffs, inflicting a cut on
his temple, and stunning and disabling him for a time. Bill was
again thrown down, the officers in vain attempting to secure his
hands with the handcuffs. Bill rose up with them, and seized a
table knife, and wounded slightly the hand of Jenkins, who held
him around the waist. This knife was wrested from him, and lkewise a fork which he hdd seized. While Bill had possession of the
carving knife, and was endeavouring" to stab the officers, some one
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cried out to them, "Why don't you shoot him?" one of them
answered, "We don't want a dead negro-do not hurt him." One
of the witnesses said, " He fought desperately, and endeavoured to
kill them." He made his way to the door at length, with two of
the officers endeavouring to hold him, and finally released himself
from them, and escaped and ran towards the river. The officers
then said they would try to frighten him, and fired off pistols, but
did not point the pistols toward him. Bill waded into the river;
some - one furnished him with a large knife. The officers then
despatched a messenger for the sheriff, who refused to render them
any assistance. Bill's clothes were much torn, and considerable
blood had been shed over his face and clothes in the struggle. A
large crowd collected-some exhorted Bill not to be taken alive,
and he declared his intention to die, or be drowned, rather'than be
taken. The officers, qfter dallying some time, being afraid to make
further atteinpts to arrest him, as no one would assist them, gave
up the attempt and went iway, saying, "l as- the negro would not
be taken alive, and they did not want him dead, they would pursue
him no farther." ,After the departure of the officers, Bill said to
two witnesses, who inquired of him if he was hurt, "that he was
inot hurt, but had some bruises about the face." He was afterwards taken away by some person on a wagon, and Made his final
escape.
We are unable to perceive in this transaction anything worthy of
blame in the conduct of these ocers in their unsuccessful endeavors io fulfil a most dangerous' and disgusting duty, except perhaps
a want of sufficient courage and -perseverance in the attempt to
execute the writ. A carefal examination of the testimony suffi-.
ciently exhibits the reason why those who were acquainted with the
facts of the case have been unwilling to prosecute the officers for
their unsuccessful attempt, and left it to those who, to use their
own language, "knew nothing about it under heaven."
In conclusion, as we find that the prisoners are officers of the
United States, "in confinement for acts done in pursuance of a law
of the United States," and- "under process from a judge of the
same;" that they have in no way'exceeded the exigency of the pro-
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cess under which they acted; that this prosecution has not been
instituted, nor is now acknowledged by the State of Pennsylvania,
but has its origin in some association living at a distance, and
wholly ignorant of the whole transaction which they have volunteered to investigate; that the information on which the warrant to
arrest the prisoners is founded, was sworn to by one who did not
know whether the matter of the affidavit presented to him was true
or false; and that by a statement of but half the truth, it is wholly
falseThe prisoners are therefore discharged.

J)i8triot Court

of the United States for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania.
THOMAS WATTSON & SONS vs. JAMES MARKS, AND OTHERS, OWNERS OF
STEAM SHIP UNION.

1. The 2d Section of the Act of Congress of March 8, 1851, "To limit the liability
of ship-owners, &c.," does not make the absence of the 'note in writing,' required by the statute, a discharge of the ship-owners liability on a contract of
afteightment, 'where the true character and value of the enumerated articles have
been fairly and clearly set down in the Bill of Lading, whether before or after the
actual shipment; nor, it seems, where such character and value, were in fact
unknown to the parties.
2. Under the 3d Section of this Act, the personal liability of the ship-owners on a
contract of affreightment, ceases upon a total destruction of the vessel and loss of
freight, before the completion of her voyage, though the actual damage to, or
loss of the goods to be carried, as in the case of theft, has taken place prior to
the time of the destruction of the vessel.
3. The limitation of liability of the ship-owner, by this section, is not affected by
the fact that the vessel has been insured, and the insurance has been paid or
become payable.

Libel in Admiralty, in personam, upon a contract of aifreightment. The facts of the case appear in the opinion of the Court.
M. Geo. X. Wharton, for Libellants.
Messrs. Ta~n and sSt. G. T. Campb l4 for Respondents.
The opinion of the Court was delivired by
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KANEu, J.-The respondents were owners, and Marks one of
their number, was master of the steamship Union, which was engaged in June, 1861, in the business of transporting merchandise
and -passengers between California and the Isthmus. While she
was so engaged, one J. B. Thomas shipped on board of her a
quantity of gold-dust, belonging to the libellants, taking a bill of
lading in the following worb:s
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On the fifth of July following, the Union while pursuing the
voyage mentioned in the bill of lading, was wrecked on the coast of
California; and at some time, either shortly before or after she
struck, the package of gold-dust belonging to the libellants, was
broken open, and its .contents made way with by some person or
persons unknown.
The libel charges that this loss occurred in consequence of the "negligence, fraud, unfaithfulness and malversation of the defendants,
their officers, servants and agents, and not by reason of any of the
causes or acts mentioned as exceptions in the bill of lading." It is
admitted that, in ordinary cases, when the contract of shipment and
the delivery by the shipper have been proved, the burden is cast on
the respondents of excusing the non-delivery at the port of destination, and that he must do this by proof that shall refer the loss
to some one or inore of the excepted risks. But it is said, that in
this case, the contract was not defined, and ascertained according
to the provisions of the Act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1851,
and that the terms of that act forbid the libellants recovering in
this proceeding, without regard to the asserted merits of their
claim.
The act referred to is the Act 1 to limit the liability of shipowners, &c" ch. 43 of 31st Congress, 2d sess. 9 S. L., the second
section of which reads thus : " And be it further enacted, that if
any shipper of gold, gold-dust, &c., shall lade the same on board
a vessel, without at the time of such lading, giving to the master,
agent, or owners of the vessel, a note in writing of the true character and value thereof, and have the same entered on the bill of
of lading therefor, the master or owners shall not be liable, as carriers thereof, in any form or manner."
Upon the phraseology of this section it is agreed, that a carrier
is not bound by the terms of his bill of lading to a shipper of golddust, unless it be shown that the shipper, at the time of lading, gave
the note in writing, which the section speaks of. The position is a
broad one, and in my judgment as dangerous as it is broad.
It asserts a general proposition, that there can be no recovery
against a carrier, where the conditions of the section have not been
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complied with; that the words of the act shall be taken literally,
and that without any question of merits, however clear may be the
breach of the carrier's contract, there can be no recourse against
him "in any form or manner," unless the shippers have given
him the note in'writing, at the time of the lading.
It thus assumes that the statute may be legitimately interpreted,
so as to shield, if not sanction fraud: for nothing, surely, can be
more unconscientious, than that a carrier, obtaining the possession
of a shipper's goods, under an engagement made with full and
exact Inowledge of its terms and import as well as object, and
receiving in advance the consideration for which he - stipulated,
shall relieve himself from accountability, for loss, destruction or
embezzlement of the goods, by an appeal to the words of the
statute.
It goes further than this, in its application to the present case.
It holds for nothing, the defendant's admission upon our record of
tlie terms of their contract, (see art. 3 of an8wers,) and their
acknowledgement that the contract was fully executed by the other
party, that the freight was paid and accepted, and that the.goods
were delivered by the shipper and received on board by the carrier,
in accordance with the terms of the bill of lading: either of which
the acknowledgement of record, or'the full performance on' one
side of a well defined contract, would take a case out of the Statute
of Frauds, according to the sternest interpretation of that statute.
It was rightfully conceded on tfie argument, that with reference
to this question, it is unimportant whether the contents were unknown to the carrier or .not, nor whether they were truly represented by the shipper. They would have been equally unknown to
the carrier, whether the note was given in writing or by parol; iqnd
he might, in either case, have called for proof that the representation was true. The note contemplated by the statute, would have
been nothing more than the shipper's assertion in writing to the
carrier, of the same facts, which the carrier, in this case, has admitted to be frue, by his writing in the margin of the bill; namely,
that the package he had received for carriage, was said by the shipper to contain 4. certain quantity of gold-dust. The question is not
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of integrity of representation by the shipper, or of his fidelity in
the performance of all his engagements towards the carrier, but
whether admitting the shipper to have framed and performed his
contract in all good faith,. he can call on the carrier to show that
he also has performed his contract, or why he has not.
In other cases that are supposeable, the extravagance of the
interpretation which the defendants contend for, would be still
more evident. Suppose the " true character and value" to be
unknown to both parties, as was the fact with many of the earlier
shipments from California, and not notified in writing, because
unknown ; or suppose the note in writing, to be given not "at the
time of lading," but before or afterwards; would it be right to hold
the contract of lading ineffective against the carrier, because the
statute had not.been, or could not be literally complied with?
Such cannot be the true reading of the Act of Congress. It was •
made to "limit the liability of shipowners," not to destroy it. Its
object was to enforce fair dealing, to let both parties know what
they were contracting about, what one was to carry, and what the
other ought rightfully to pay. If this object is effected by the concurrent acts of the parties, it seems to me that the statute is satisfled. If the shipper took care that the " true character and value,"
or what he" and the carrier believed to be the true character and
value, was fairly and clearly set down on the bill of lading, and
there has been from the first no misapprehension of fact on either
side, I cannot think it important to inquire whether the entry on
the bill was preceded by a written note, or whether the entry was
in fact made at or before or after the time of lading. I shall therefore hold, until I am otherwise instructed, that where the contract
of carriage has been clearly defined in all its particulars by the
parties themselves, and there is no imputation of either fraud or
mistake against the shipper, but he has fully executed his side of the
contract, the other party shall not relieve himself from its performance, by alleging that there has been a want of literal conformity
to the provisidns of this section. In other words, I will hold the
carrier estopped from denying the liability which he has expressed
in his bill of lading, if I find in that instrument a substantial, but
11
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clear recognition of all the facts which the statute required him to
be apprised of.
I give the Act of Congress this interpretation the more willingly,
because I cannot believe it was intended to destroy the commercial
value of the bill of lading, in the large class of transactions to which
the section applies, and to reverse the long established policy of the
law, by requiring parol proof as the condition of validating a 'written contract. For if it be true, that the note in writing must have
preceded the entry on the bill;. if it must have been given by the
shipper, and to the shipowner or his agent; if it must have expressed the true charact6r and value, then the shipper before her
can lawfully reclaim his goods, or recover damages" for the spoliation of them, must be prepared with proofs, inpais, of all those
facts. The bill of lading ceases to be negotiable--its language no
longer declares its import.
I might limit the interpretation of this section 'without- perhaps,
changing its operation on the present case; by a Yeference to some
of the words of the Act, 'which were not remarked on, otherwise
than incidentally, in the, argument. The negation of liability on
the part of the shipowners is, after all, not absolute : the section
speaks only of a liability 1 as earries," leaving the liability under.
less special contract of bailment unchanged. But I prefer giving
a distinct expression to the opinions I have formed upon the general phraseology of the act. I hold, that on this bill of lading, the
shipowners are liable, even as carriers.
But I apprehend, that in the case before me, this liability is a
'barren one. The 3d and 4th sections of tho Act of Congress
restrict the owner's liability to "the amount or value of the inte-.
rest in the vessel and the freight then pending." It is conceded
that the steamship Union- was totally lost by the disaster 'which has
given rise to this suit; but it is said, that the spoliation of the golddust preceded the loss of the ship, and that the measure of the
defendant's liability therefore, is her value before the wreck took
place. I do not think the evidence sustains the assertion. We do
not know exactly the time at which the gold-dust was stolen. It
had, beyond all- doubt, been removed from -the locker, in- which it
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was stored on board, before the captain left the vessel after the
'wreck. The purser tells us, he passed out all that the locker contained. The box was not missed, however, until the rest of the
treasure had been carried ashore, and it was not until twenty-four
hours afterwards that it was found, broken open, and on board.
To my mind, it is reasonably clear, that the box was purloined on
its way from the locker to the boat, and was then secreted on b6ard
until the next day presented an opportunity for opening it. It
could hardly have been stolen before the.confusion of the wreck.
It was accessible till then, only to two persons, the captain and the
stewardess, either of whom, if disposed to rob, might have taken
half a million as easily as a thousand dollars worth, and who would
either have kept their plunder in its original package-forhn, to make
its removal and secretion easier, or else have thrown the box, which
was the badge of ownership, overboard. All the circumstancesfavor the idea, that the loss would not have taken place if the ship
had not gone ashore,and they refer it, I think, with every aspect
of probability to the rapacity of third persons, stimulated and
screened from detection by the general alarm.
But whether the robbery preceded or followed the moment of
wreck, or was contemporaneous with it, is, in my judgment, of no
importance; We may, perhaps, gather the meaning of our statute
on this branch of the question, from the general maritime law.
Whatever may have been the law of the continent in times very long
gone by, when the Magister, and the Exercisor, and the Navientarius, and the Dominus iavis, were sometimes one and sometimes
distinct, and when the liabilities of ownership were more or less
dependent on the capacity which one or the other of these titles
implied, it is certain that since the ordinance of 1681, and even
long before, the owners have been liable for the captain's acts to
the extent of their interest in the ship and freight, but no further.
The exceptions to the universality of this limitation, were of Engglish parentage, and, referred themselves directly to the policy of
the old common law of that island. The 'iser rule of the continent was adopted for Great Britain, in the 7th year of George 2d,
some half a century after the ordinance of the French King had
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defined the commercial usage of the rest of the world. (Judge
Washington, in the Seneca.) From the English statute, or rather,
through it, the provisions which: are found in our Act of Congress,
have been derived at second or third hands.
It haa been a subject of discussion among some of the French commentators, whether the subsequent loss of the vesseli or its surrender
by the owners, released them from the legitimately made contracts
of the captain; (See Yalin, L. 2, T. 8. Art. 2-Emergon, Contr.
Gr., e. 4. § 11.-Poth.r,Obhns. 4511,-i Boulay .Paty,Com. Dr.
Mar. 270, &c.) But 1 am not aware that such a -queftion has ever
arisen, .where the claim to charge the owners was founded on the
master's delict or want of skill. At least it may be regarded. as
settled now, that the owner's liability for the delicts and" quasidelicts of the master, ceases upon a surrender of the vessel-vith her
freight, and does not survive her destruction. (See the authors
above cited, and 1 Pardessus, C.ours Dr. Com., p. 4, T. 2, c. 3, § 2.)
The only opinion I have met with, seemingly-at variance with
this, may be derived from the language of Judge Story, in Pope. vs.
Nickerson, 3 Stor. 497. "Suppose" he says, when speaking of
the limited liability of the shipowner, "Suppose after the right of
action has attached, the ship perishes : that will not affect the right.
of recovery of the shipper in 6 case of tort, and a fortiori, it will
not in a case of coutact, made by the master, by and uhder. the
authority of the owners. This doctrine is fully sustained by the
the cases of .Dobree vs. S'croder, 6 Sim. 29, 2 MyIn. & Cr. 4890
and Wilson vs. Dcwkson 2 B. & A. 2
It might be sufficient to remark, that the learned Judge was commenting on a statute of Massachusetts, which differed materially,
from the general Law Maritime, and from our Act of Congresp, in
that it seems to have made no provision for a surrender of the ship
and freight, and thus, as the Judge says, left the remedy to be
strictly in personam; and that, besides this, the position assumed
by him was not necessary, nor perhaps even directly involved in the
case he was considering. But .I have not found in the cases he
refers to, a clear affirmation of the principle.for which he invokes
them, if that .principle is to be extended in its "application to the
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case before me. Dobree vs. Schroder, turned upon the question,
whether, where the vessel had made freight once or more after the
delict, and had been deteriorated by ordinary wear, her value was
to be-ascertained at the time of suit brought, or at the time when
the right of action adcrued; and the case of Wils3on vs. Diceson,
was one of collision, in which the defendant's vessel survived the
delict, and was not lost till some time after the right of action had
accrued. The first was not a case of total loss: the second, being
one of tort and in personam, the right of action attached instanter,
and could not be varied by subsequent circumstances. Not so,. the
liability of a carrier, for goods lost or purloined. He may find
them again before the voyage ends, or reclaim them from the thief
in time to make delivery in conformity to the terms of his bill of
lading. There. is no liability, in his case, if the shipper gets his
goods according to the eontract of carriage; nor can the shipper'
complain of accident or wreck, though the goods are transhipped in
consequence, if they come to him in time and in good order. The
right of action against the carrier therefore, unlike that which grows
out of a collision, does not accrue till the end of the voyage, or the
lapse of a reasonable time for the delivery of the cargo.
It is impossible, however, to give effect to the 4th section of the
Act of Coigress, unless we suppose that, in cases of affreightment
at least, the measure of his ability is the value of the vessel and
freight at the time of suit brought. That section provides, that
where the whole value of the vessel and her freight for the voyage
shall not be sufficient to make compensation for the losses which
the shippers have sustained by the embezzlement, loss, or destruction of their goods, the owner of the vessel may take appropriate
proceedings in any court for the purpose of apportioning the amount
of his liability among the parties entitled; and that upon the transfer of his interest, in the vessel and freight, to a trustee name4 by
the Court, all claims and proceedings against the owner shall cease."
How can this "transfer of his interest" pass more than he has at
the time ? Y6t, upon such a present transfer, all claims and proceedings against the owner are to cease ;-1" claims and proceed-
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ings to cease "-implying, clearly, that such proceedings against
him may be actually pending at the time of the transfer.
The terms of this section may be said to be inapplicable to the
case of a total loss, where tlere remains nothing to transfer; but
.as both sections relate to the same liability, the 4th giving effect to'
that which was declared by the 3d, the import of the 3d section becomes altogether clear, namely, that the owner shall not be personally liable, where he has no longer any interest in the ship or
her freight. It never could be the purpose of Congress, that he
who has lost a part of his investment, should be relieved from his
liabilities, while his equally innocent neighbor remains bound, because he has lost all.
The policy of our own law is happily explained by Emerigon in
his remarks on the corresponding law of France.' "The owner's
liability" he says, for the captain's acts, is rather a liability in rem
than inpersonam (nulle gue personelle.) While the voyage is in
progress, the captain may take up moneys on bottomry, or pledge
the apparel of the .ship, or even sell his cargo. But this is all.
His legal authority does not go beyond the limits of the ship under
his command, the ship confided to his administration. He cannot
involve the.general estate of his owners, unless they have specially.
authorized him to do so. In the absence of special authority,
there is no personal recourse against the owners, unless they elect
to ,retain their interest in the ship; if the ship perishes, or they
release their interest in it, they cease to be answerable." Ainer.
Contr. a la Gr. ch. 4, § 11.
"And such," says Boulay Paty, was the. maritime law of the
middle ages; as appears by the Consulado, ch. 33 and 236, Cleirac,.
Rivigres, art. 15, Kurricke, stat. of Hamburg, Grotius, and numerous other authors on this title of the Law," "And-this too,"
he says, is the more equitable, inasmuch as the owner is at such a
distance from-his captain, as to make it impossible to overlook him
or even communicate with him. The exposure of the owner's ship
and freight to loss, not to speak of the goods he may, himself, have
put on board, .isquite interest enough to ensure his selection of a
reliable captain." 1 Dr. Com. .Mar, 269.
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He expands the same idea some pages further on. After reasserting that the captain's acts and delicts cannot involve his owners
beyond the ship and freight, and that they may absolve themselves
altogether, by surrendering these interests, he says: (p. 286,)
" The owners entrust to the captain's administration only a certain
value, that of their ship. To authorize the captain to make them
debtors beyond this value, would be to place the fortune of the
owners at the mercy of an agent purely special. The ownership of
vessels would be altogether too hazardous, if such a power as this
were vested in the captain, often a captain not even chosen by the
owners; for we know that in the course of a voyage, and in certain
cases, the captain may delegate his 'powers to another, or an unknown person may be appointed by the magistrate to replace the
one who was commissioned by the owners."
Recognizing, then, the liability of the owners upon a contract ofcarriage like this, I am of opinion, also, that such liability is at an
end, upon the total destruction of the vessel and loss of freight
before the completion of the voyage.
Nor is there any thing, as it strikes me, in the 'circumstance that
the vessel was insured, and that a loss has been paid on her, or is
,still payable. The limit of the liability, the subject matter of the
surrender in discharge of it, was the "1value and amount of the
owner's interest." If the vessel has ceased to exist, if the wreck
was complete, and there is no longer property in her or in her
remains for any one, the owner's interest is gone. He has nothing
to surrender. There is not a word in the act about the insurance
moneys, which he has received or might claim. These are not his
interest in the vessel.
The policy of insurance is a distinct independent subject of property. No equity attaches upon the proceeds of it in favor of third
persons, unless there be some contract, agreement, or trust, to that
effect. Ellis on Insur. 81. The assignment of a ship passes no
interest in an outstanding policy. The fire insurance policy on a
house is a merely personal contract, and it passes even in equity to
the executor, not the heir. Mildmay/ vs. f-ogham, 3 Ves. 472.
A mortgagee bas no claim upon its proceeds. Vernon vs. ,rmith,
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5 B. &A. 1. And as the marine policy is a merely personal contract between the insurer and the'assured, so. the rights of action,
which flow from it in case of logs, are strictly personal also. It is
not, it never was an interest in the thing insured. In a case of
total loss, the rights of the assured to recover by force of it, spring
up and have their being only from the moment when his interest in
the thing expired.
But if even thu vessel had continued to exist in syecie, the total
loss being constructive only, and made so by abandonment to the
underwriters, the law, .asit seems to me, would be the same. The
underwriters could take no more under an abandonment and cession
than the assured had at the time of loss. The ship, in thei'r hands,
would be liable still, and primarily, for wages, for salvage, also, for
maritime loans, for repairs and supplies furnished abroad, and on
hypothecations, implied- by the contract of alfreightment. The qurrender or transfer, contemplated by the Act of Congress, affects
the underwriters no more than did the implied hypothecation, out
of which it grows, and for which it can hardly be said to be substituted. Such a transfer is merely the formalization of a trust existing before, a trust now to be administered by the Court, instead of
the shipowner, an act of law, or under legal sanction, which passes°
the legal title out of the owner, :but leaves the creditors 6f the vessel in the same plight against her as before. The abandonment is
of the residuary interest of the shipowner, of the snrplus, if there
be any, after payment of all the. charges on the ship and freight.
Such is the conclusion of Boulay Paty, after a well-reasoned
train of remarks on the same question, under" the Code Civile, 1
Dr. Com. Mer. 293. He begins by marking the distinction between.
the nature and effects. of an abandonment to insurers, (delai8s8m'enI,)

and those of a surrender (abandon) by the ship owner to -the use of
the shippers
"By the abandonment," he says, "the ownership of the thing
insured passes to the underwriters, who share it among them pro
rata, whether there be loss or profit in the result. The surrender,
on the other hand, has a different effect. It is simply a declaration
by the owner of the ship, that he no longer asserts any control
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over the property, but passes it to the shipper, that he may seek
payment from it, and not from the owner personally. But, differing in this from the underwriters, the shipper has not become an
owner." He can only pay himself his debt; he cannot derive a
profit from the surrender. In a word, there is the same difference
between them as between an owner and a creditor having a Privilegium or hypothecation. The surrender is a renunciation of
ownership of 'the vessel, having for its only object the relief of the
owner from the debts which encumber the thing, not a transmission
of the ownership to others. It is of the same sort with the act of
an heir, when he r6nounces the inheritance to avoid paying the
encumbrances upon it; or the purchaser of mortgaged premises,
who gives them up rather than stand liable to the mortgagee; or
the debtor, who makes a cession as a bankrupt.
"The abandonment to the insurers.is very different from thiis. It
is an absolute turning over of the thing, for which they are to pay
the price; which makes them owners of the thing, and subjects
them to all the charges of ownership, unless they prefer surrendering it in their turn.
"This distinction meets all the objections that can be made.
They are all resolved by the different natures of the abandonment
and the surrender; the former of which makes an owner, the latter
only a creditor of the thbig. By the abandonment to the insurers,
s they become owners under it, they stand charged with the debts
which encumbered the. thing before, and which still adhere to it;
while the surrender to creditors has no other effect than a declaration that the former owner of the thing asserts no right over it any
longer, and that the creditors must seek it, in whose hands soever it
may be, to get payment from it.
"It follows that the shipowner may, by such a surrender, turn
over the shipper against the insurers, who have become, by the
abandonment, owners of ship and freight, and thus make abandonment and surrender both. The abandonment will not on that
account be partial; for the shipowner, though bound to convey
the entire thing, to wit the ship with its freight, is not on that
account bound to clear it of the debts with which the acts of the
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captain have encumbered it during his administration. Such debts
are a natural charge upon the thing, diminishing its value, but not
hindering its integral transfer, subject to the charge."
Returning again, after some paragraphs, to the same subject, he
says, (p. 297 :) "The product of the insurance is the consideration
(prix) of the premium which the shipowner has paid to insure her.
This premium is not pledged (affecte d garantie)for the obligations
of the captain: the law pledges only tho ship and freight; consequently tthe shippers have no right upon the insurance moneys.
They do not in general represent the ship, but become, when the
ship is lost, the basis of a direct personal, action in favor of the
assured."
*I have found a single line in Pardessus, which does not' consist
with this doctrine of Boulay Paty. It forms part of the -section I
have quoted before. Referring to the surrender by a shipowner,
which reie'ves him from personal liability, he says: "It follows,
that if the ship has been insured, the owner should surrender his
rights against the underwriters." He does not expand the position
beyond the words I have quoted, and does not sustain it either by
argument or authority. The reasoning of Boulay Paty, who wrote
afterwards,. seems to me unanswerable; and it is borne out by the
established policy of commercial institutions. It would discourage
insurances,*were we to deny to the shipowner the benefit of the contract for -which he has paid his premium. It would discriminafe to
the disadvantage of the small capitalist, who must insure with third
persons, in favor of the millibnaire, whose extended means allow
him to stand his own underwriter, and who, not receiving the
amount of loss from third persons, would not be called on to pay itover to the shipper;- or to the disadvantage of the prudent, in
favor of the reckless.
What matters it to the shipper, whether the ship was insured by
the owner himself or by a third party? What right can he claim
in the one case more than in the other? He did not in either .case
contribute towards the premium of insurance; it added nothing to
the freight he engaged to pay; he never stipulated that the ship
should be insured at all, nor inqtired whether it was so. He gave
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credit, when he shipped, to the vessel; she became hypothecated to
him as she stood; the owner's liabity was measured by her value.
What has he to do 'with the other contracts of the owner, whether
made afterwards or before? What right has he to expect that the
fruits of them shall be superadded to the only security for which
he bargained?
Besides, the hypothecation between ship and cargo is reciprocal.
Each is bound to the other; and both, I suppose, should be bound
alike, and with the same incidents. If the owner's policy on the
ship is to enure to the indemnity of the shipper of cargo, must not
the shipper's insurance on his goods be pledged for the payment of
freight, and be taxed accordingly, where the freight has been otherwise lost by a peril of the seas? But it is unnecessary, to follow
out this train of remark. If it were never so desirable to turn over
the policy on the ship to the profit or indemnity of the shipper of
cargo, and if it were not of all things the easiest to cover up the
fact that such an insurance was in existence, a simple restriction of
the assignable quality of the instrument, such as we find in our
policies against fire, would make the effort futile. A single line of
memorandum would do the business.
I cannot hold, therefore, the amount, whatever it mpay be, that
has been paid or that may be payable by the insurers, as a part of
the defendants' interest in the ship and her freight.' The result is,
that there can be no recovery against the owners as such.
As to the individual liability of Captain Marks, I have only to
say, that it is not a question on these pleadings. As the master of
the ship, however ably and faithfully he may have borne himself in
circumstances of singular embarrassment and difficulty, I am not
prepared to affirm that, as a carrier, he has brought himself within
the exceptions of his bill of lading. But the only issue I am called
on to decide is between the shippers and the owners as such. My
decree must be for the defendants.
Decree for defendants, with costs.

CURCIER vs. BARCLAY.

,Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, sitting at Ni8i .Priu.
PETER E. PRVAIL, EXECflTOR &C.OF ANDREW OUROME

VS. 30RN A. 3BAR-

CLAY, SURVIVING TRUSTEE IN INSOLVENCY OF ANDREW OURCIER.
1. The trustee of an insolvent debtor was appointed in 1837. In 1848 the debtor
died, and his executor proceeded immediately to collect and administer his estate
according to law, became involved in law suits, settled an administration account,
and.was decreed to distribute the balance in 1851, having, in the settlement of
the estate incurred heavy expenses, and expended much time and lAbor. The
insolvent trustee had in'nowise acted, except by giving securityj in 1848, till
1851, when he instituted an action against the executor, to recover the principal
portion of the assets, on the ground that it had formed part of the decedent's
estate at the time of his insolvent discharge, but had been fraudulently concealed.
The trustee, as well as the creditors whom he represented; had been aware of the
proceedings of the executor during the whole period, -but no notice had been
given of an intended suit, nor any.proceeding commen'ced. -The trustee was
restrained by injunction, on bill filed by the executor, from further proceeding
in his action, on the ground of laches.
2. A trustee will not be.permitted to carry on unnecessary litigation to the injury of a third person, merely for the purpose of earning commissions.

This was a bill for an injunction to restrain proceedings at law,.
and for other relief.
The material facts and allegations of the amended bill, were as
follows: Andrew Curcier, a merchant of the City of Philadelphia, hiving
become embarrassed in business, applied for the benefit of the insolvent laws of Pennsylvauia, and was duly dischirged thereunder on
the 6th of July, 1837, having previously made the statutory assign-.
ment for the benefit of his creditors. The defendant, being a creditor of Curcier, and another, who died before acceptance, were appointed trustees. The defendant never acted under the trust in
any manner, until the 6th of June, 1848, when he gave security as
required by law; nor did he thereafter take any steps until the
29th of March, 1851, when he commenced in this Court the suit
against the complainant, subsequently referred to. In the meantime, about the. beginning of the year 1843, Curcier died, having
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made his will, which the complainant, the sole acting executor
proved, and took out letters testamentary thereon. He immediately entered upon the duties of his trust, filed an inventory, and
advertised according to law. After the expiration of the year he
fied his account, having given due notice to creditors and others;
and on the 21st of June, 1844, the account was referred by the
Court of Common Pleas, to an Auditor, before whom the usual proceedings were had, and on the 21st of March, 1851, the Court
ordered the balance then found due, to be distributed according to
law. By means of the various advertisements and notices, and of
various suits brought against the complainant, by reason of the
intricate and entangled condition in which Curcier had left his
estate, and by the proceedings before the Auditor, it was alleged
that the defendant and others interested, had full notice of all the
facts concerning the estate. The suits against the complainant,
however, two of which involved the whole fund, which had prevented the earlier settlement of the estate, had all been quieted
and determined, except the one brought by the defendant, which it
was now sought to restrain. Nearly all questions of law and fact,
and the evidence thereon, had been heard by the Auditor; the
creditors of the estate had been duly notified, and had all attended
the meetings of the audit; among them the defendant. Nothing
remained but the distribution of the fund.
The defendant, however, as trustee in insolvency of Curcier, had
brought an action of trover in this Court, in March, 1851, to recover certain shares of stock, which Wvere all the assets of any importance included in the inventory fied by the complainant, and
had given notice thereof to the Auditor. The -ground of the
action was, that this stock had been in the possession of Curcier
before his insolvent discharge, and therefore had never rightfully
come into the hands of the complainant. The effect of the suit
was to stop the distribution, and to prevent further proceedings in
the audit.
The complainant, as his ground for relief set up the laches of
the defendant, and of the creditors whom he represented, in remaining inactive for a period of nearly fourteen years; in standing
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by for eight years while the complainant was winding up the estate,
therein incurring large expenses, and expending great labor and
pains, without commencing suit, or giving any notice of his intention to do so; and without intervening or interposing in any way,
while two suits were brought against the complainant for the purpose of sweeping the fund from his possession, and also from that
of the defendant, were he in fact entitled thereto; one of which
suits had been conducted by the defendant's counsel. It was
alleged, that should the defendant be successful in his action,
even if the complainant would not be liable in his own person for
the expenses of the administration, and left unpaid for his labor
therein; yet he would be in a very debateable position, while on
the other hand the business of the estate had been of an unusually
perilous and complicated nature, and one which requied more
than common prudencei labor, and diligence on his part.
The only motive for the delay, was alleged to be an action of
trover brought in the District Court, to March Term, 1844,
against the complainant, to recover the shares of stock in question,
by one Cabot, assignee for creditors under a voluntary assignment,
dated June 1st, 1837, which was finally determined in this suit to
be fraudulent and void. This suit was favored, so the complainant
asserted, by the defendant, who- would have permitt6d a recovery
therein, though the assignment was for the benefit of, certain preferred, creditors, and not for that of creditbrs in general. This
position which he had taken, it was'said the defendant was bound by.
It was further alleged that the defendant'g action, if successful,
would only have the effect of distributing, after a long period of
time, the assets in the same manner, and to the same individuals ;.
that the delay and expense would be very great; and that tlhe only
object of the proceeding *as to give the defendant commissions.
The complainant further denied that the stock in question had
.been in the possession of Curcier at the time of the assignment, or
that there was any ground in fact for the action. He also insisted
that he was equally the representative of creditors in general, and
that the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court, a competent tribunal,
having attached, prior to security being entered by the defendant,
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it was incompetent now to attempt to transfer the distribution to a
mirely concurrent Court.
The bill then set forth the names of the creditors who had appeared before the Auditor, who were alleged to be all who had
claims on the estate, or at least all who would be likely to appear.
The bill further set up the statute of limitations, as a bar to the
defendant's claim, if any he had.
The bill prayed that the defendant's action of trover, and other
proceedings in law and equity, in the same matter, might be rest7rained.
The answer admitted the principal facts, but asserted that the
action in question was well founded in law and in fact; that the
stock sought to be recovered, or the funds with which it.had been
purchased, had been fraudulently concealed by Curcier at the time
of his insolvent discharge, and that it had been received by the
complainant from him before his death, under circumstances of
suspicion which would have induced a prudent man to refuse to
accept it. The defendant further admitted his knowledge of the
suit by Cabot, though not that of any other, but asserted that he
had supposed the assignment to Cabbt to be valid, and that therefore proceedings on his part would be futile; that this suit was not
decided upon till 1848, when it was determined, under a technical
rule of law, which had grown up and been decided since the making
of the assignment, and not on the merits. He further, while
admitting the correctness of the list of names of the creditors
stated in the bill, alleged that severil of those named, and others
claiming to be creditors, not so named, had called upon him to proceed in the suit, sought to be restrained, and had urged him to
action thereon. He further stated that he had appeared before
the Auditor not as a creditor, but as trustee in insolvency, and had
set up his claim to the assets as such, which the Auditor had
' See Hennessy vs. The Western Bank, 6 Watts & Serg., 301; Duhring's App., 13
Penn St. R. 806, and other cases which establish the rule tlat an assignment stipulating for a release, not containing words capable of passing the whole of the
assignor's property, of whatever nature, is void.
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refused to receive. He finally asserted that he would be able to
prove, at the proper time and place, that the suit had been brought
within six years after the cause of action had occurred.
The case was argued by
Mr. 6. Ingersoll, for the complainant.
Mr. Ingraham, for the defendant.
The opinion of-the Court was delivered by
GiBsoN, J.-As the agency of a trustee is without stipulation
for compensation, -the "legal ownership with which, he is clothed,
gives him no beneficial interest in the trust. He is an instrument
in the hands of a chancellor. In contemplation of law, his services are benevolent and gratuitous; and though it is sual in
Pennsylvania and the other 'American States, to allow him a commission, it is of grebe. In England he gets nothing, and even
here he has no fixed rate of remuneration; In a Court of Equity,
the parties to whose .interests a chancellor attends, are those who
are beneficially concerned in the execution of the trust. Now Mr.
Barclay, the trustee, stands before me on a dry legal title, without
value to him further than as it may conduce to his interest as a
creditor; and in the latter character he is on a level #ith the -rest.
In the action-which'is the -subject of this bill, he sues as a trustee,
and I have nothing to do with him more than I have to do with
those he represents. The distribition of an insolvent petitioner's
effects, is somewhat different from the distribution of an insolvent
decedent's assets; and had not the creditors in insolvency become
chargeable with unpardonable delay, I would not deny the right of.
their trustees to go before a jury on the question of cohcealment.
Mr. Barclay himself has ihot been guilty of negligence, for he was
not bound to accept the trust in any given time, or at all, and his
imputed sins of omission or commission, cannot be visited on those
who were not represented by him. But might not they themselves
lose the priority of their right by inaction ? During almost eleven
years, they suffered it to sleep. They might abandon it alto-
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gether; and did they not, when they'neglected to procure from
the Common Pleas an active trustee ? They slept on their right,
and during their slumber, what could the insolvent's executor do?
Certainly nothing to' rouse them; and if he collected and distributed the assets, he would, according to the respondent, be liable for
a conversion of them; and if he did not, he might be liable to the
general creditors for a devatavit of them. He could not compel
the creditors in insolvendy to move, and he took the only course
which was open to him: he filed an inventory; gave notice to
debtors and creditors; became involved in law suits; settled an
administration account, and was decreed to distribute the balance
according to law. And now the trustee of the creditors in insolvency, founds his right to prosecute his action on their merit
in having played the part of the dog in the manger.
Ought I then to hear him in opposition to the executor's distribution, when it has almost touched the point of its completion?
I put Mr. Barclay's legal ownership out of the case. With it or
without it, what case has he, or what case have they? Had he
earned commissions, I would be the last to deprive him of them;
but I certainly will not suffer him to injure, perhaps ruin another,
to give him an opportunity to earn them. If he should recover the
assets, Mr. Frevall, who bore the burthen and heat of the day,
would get nothing unless there were double compensation for single
services. Had Mr. Barclay or any other qualified trustee brought
an action in season, his right to try it would not have been denied;
but as he and the creditors he represents were inactive till the
executor became entangled, they are too late.
Let the writ of injunction be issued.

